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The Palestinian Poverty Problem in the Era of
Globalization
ARIEL J. LEINWAND*

INTRODUCTION

At the end of 2001, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was again vexing not only
the Israelis and Palestinians but also the international community. The new
intifada (uprising) that began in September 2000 has produced widespread
violence between Palestinians and Israelis, including Palestinian attacks on Israeli
civilian populations and incursions of Israeli military forces into Palestiniancontrolled areas on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories). The
long, historical struggle between the Jews and Palestinians that began after the
famous Balfour Declaration, in 1917, had entered one of its most violent and
precarious stages.
One of the most serious consequences of the violence stemming from the
new intifada has been a dramatic increase in poverty within the Palestinian
Territories. Fears about the implications of this increase in Palestinian poverty for
the Israeli-Palestinian relationship echo similar concerns about Palestinian poverty
and the need for economic development in the Palestinian Territories made during
the Oslo peace process. A tenet of the Oslo peace process was that peace would
not be sustainable between Israel and the Palestinians unless the Palestinians
experienced economic development and rising standards of living. The framers
of Oslo recognized that in order to stimulate Palestinian economic development as
part of the peace process, the Palestinian economy must be connected to the
processes of globalization. The Oslo process did not successfully reduce
Palestinian poverty because the Palestinian economy did not adequately get
connected to the global market. The dramatic increase in poverty within the
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.P.A. Candidate, 2003, Indiana
University School of Public and Environmental Affairs-Bloomington School of Public Affairs; B.A., East Asian
Languages and Literature, 1999, Indiana University. The author wishes to express his immense gratitude to
Professor Fidler for his help and instrumental guidance in focusing this topic and developing this note. The author
would like to thank Professor Buxbaum and Professor Heidt for their continuing assistance and patience. Finally,
the author would also like to thank his family for their ongoing love, support, and encouragement.
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Palestinian Territories since the beginning of the new intifada demonstrates that
the Palestinian poverty problem remains central to the resolution of the struggle
between Israel and the Palestinians. At present, no viable strategies to promote
Palestinian economic development in the context of globalization are evident,
leaving a cloud of uncertainty over the economic future of the Palestinian people
and little hope for a final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This note analyzes the Palestinian poverty problem in the global era. Part I
describes the historical and contemporary features of the Palestinian poverty
problem. Part II briefly outlines the dominant strategy on economic development
and poverty alleviation in the context of globalization. This part serves as a
prelude to the analysis of the strategy for economic development in the Oslo
Accords (Part III), which attempted to establish a framework to develop the
Palestinian economy in a matter consistent with the dominant strategy on
economic development and poverty alleviation in the global era. Part III further
discusses the failure of the Oslo strategy. Part IV then addresses the post-Oslo
Palestinian economic crisis by examining the current Israeli thinking about
separating Israel and the Palestinian Territories both physically and economically.
I argue that the separation strategy does not represent a realistic solution to the
deepening Palestinian poverty problem in the context of globalization. With a
return to the Oslo approach equally unrealistic in the current climate of violence
and distrust, prospects for alleviating the Palestinian poverty problem remain
bleak.
I. THE PALESTINIAN POVERTY PROBLEM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
PATTERNS

As with most politically exacerbated economic problems, the roots of the
Palestinian poverty problem can be traced far back in history. Such deep
historical context is beyond the scope of this note.2 I begin my analysis of the
Palestinian poverty problem with the period in which Israel occupied the West
Bank and Gaza Strip (1967-1993). I then trace what occurred during the Oslo
peace process in terms of the Palestinian economy 1993 through September

2. For a discussion of the historical conflict between Arabs and Jews, see generally MERON BENVENISTI,
INTIMATE ENEMIES: JEWS AND ARABS IN A SHARED LAND (1995); IAN J. BICKERTON & CARLA L. KLAUSIm,
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (3d ed. 1998).

A
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2000. Finally, I describe the economic calamity that has befallen the Palestinian
economy after the start of the new intifada in September 2000.
A. The PalestinianEconomy During Occupation, 1967-1993
As a consequence of its victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. From 1967 until 1987, Israel integrated the Palestinian
economy with the larger Israeli economy. This forced economic integration of
the Palestinian and Israeli economies produced growth in the Palestinian
economy. From the end of the Six Day War until the beginning of the first
4
intifada in 1987, Palestinian economic growth outpaced that of Israel's.
While the Palestinian economy grew from 1967 to 1987 through contact with
the Israeli economy, the growth was politically and morally objectionable to the
Palestinians. Palestinian economic growth in this period was a function of what
the Palestinians believed to be illegitimate occupation by a foreign power and thus
in violation of the Palestinian right to self-determination under international law.
Furthermore, Israel controlled the structure and dynamics of Palestinian growth,
which was also unacceptable to the Palestinians. From the beginning of the
occupation, Israel mandated that most Palestinian imports and exports flow
through Israel. 5 The Palestinian's trade dependence on Israel not only involved
goods, but also services.6 Palestinian dependence on Israel is illustrated by the
importance of the Israeli economy for Palestinian employment. By 1992, for
example, thirty-four percent of the Palestinian labor force was employed in
Israel. 7 The heavy reliance of the Palestinian labor force on the Israeli economy
for employment is one of the leading reasons for decreases in the Palestinian
poverty rate between 1967 and 1987.8
Palestinian trade, services, and

3. ARIE ARNON, THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY:

BETWEEN IMPOSED INTEGRATION AND VOLUNTARY

SEPARATION 21 (1997).
4. Barbra Kotschwar, Small Countries and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, in TRADE RULES IN THE
MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 134-36 (Miguel Rodriguez Mendozaet
al. eds., 1999).
5. YEZID SAYIGH & KHALIL SHIKAKI, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, STRENGTHENING PALESTINIAN

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 94 (1999), http://www.cfr.org/public/pubs/palinstfull.html.
6. See generally PALESTINE ECON. POLICY RESEARCH INST. (MAS) & WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENTUNEIR

ADVERSITY: THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION (Ishac Diwan & Radwan A. Shaban eds., 1999),
http://www.palecon.org/wbdocs [hereinafter MAS].

7. Id.at 5.
8. Id. Though the flow of Palestinian labor benefited both economies, the reliance of Palestinian workers on
Israel for employment has proven to be one of the most debilitating features of Palestinian economic dpmsceon
the Israeli economy during and after the period of Israeli occupation. Id.
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employment, thus became structurally dependent on Israel's economic
infrastructure and occupation policies.
B. The PalestinianEconomy Duringthe Oslo Peace Process 1993-2000
When the Oslo peace process started in 1993, it ushered in a new era for the
Palestinian economy. Israel, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the
World Bank, and other participating countries recognized that without more
economic growth and opportunity for the Palestinian people, peace between Israel
and the Palestinians would remain elusive. The strategy for Palestinian economic
development in the Oslo process is discussed in Part III of this note. This section
presents the state of the Palestinian economy between 1993 and 2000.
Palestinian economic development during the Oslo peace process exhibited a
pattern of growth followed by economic hardship that coincided with acts of
violence committed against Israel by Palestinians opposed to the peace process.
Because imports and exports of goods and services into and out of the Palestinian
Territories depended on the Israeli trade infrastructure, such imports and exports
were very vulnerable to Israeli border closures. From 1993 to 2000, Israel often
closed its borders with the Palestinian Territories as a security response to
Palestinian violence against Israel- 9 Export-driven economic growth in the
Palestinian Territories never developed because of the repeated border closures
and constant uncertainty about when closures would be lifted or imposed again.
The border closures also caused the Palestinian economy great distress in
connection with Israeli employment of Palestinian workers. The border closures
and a general Israeli policy to try and reduce the level of Palestinian employment
caused the percentage of Palestinian labor to drop from thirty-four percent in
1992 to five percent in 1996.10 Israeli employers also began to use workers from
other regions, such as Eastern Europe and South Asia, as a permanent substitute
for Palestinian labor." These changes caused further damage to the Palestinian
economy because it no longer benefited from Israeli-source wages and thus
increasingly suffered the burden of growing unemployment. This set the stage
for widespread poverty to emerge in the Palestinian Territories.
The economic vulnerability of the Palestinian economy during the Oslo
process is further illustrated by comparing the impact of the economic
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
II. Id. at 3.
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dislocations on Israel. In December 2000, the New York Times reported that the
projected growth domestic product (GDP) of the Palestinian Territories for the
year 2)00 would be negative ten percent.' 2 Israel, on the other hand, had a
projected GDP growth of four percent for the year 2000.13 These statistics do
not mean that the Israelis are not economically effected by the lack of peace, but
rather this comparison shows the much more dramatic effect that the border
closures and rise in Palestinian unemployment had on the Palestinian economy.
Other deficiencies in the Palestinian economy exacerbated the economic
impact of border closures on exports of Palestinian goods, services, and labor. 14
During the Oslo period, the Palestinian Territories witnessed very little investment
in the private sector, which was in direct contrast to the enormous growth of the
Palestinian public sector.' 5 Though expansion of the Palestinian public sector
was necessary to build a modem Palestinian economy, public sector growth alone
could not sustain growth in the overall Palestinian economy. Furthermore, the
type of growth occurring in the Palestinian public sector was not all positive.
Most of the expansion involved hiring civil servants while public investment in
basic infrastructure was negligible. 16 Between 1993 and 1996, total infrastructure
investment in the Palestinian Territories amounted to less than two percent of
GDP per year.' 7 Developing nations as a whole have an average investment in
infrastructure of four percent and in certain cases up to eight percent of GDP. 8
The combination of a rapidly growing but unproductive public sector with the
lack of public and private investment in infrastructure and productive capacity
created an inefficient and poorly paid public sector.' 9 Public-sector hiring
became a short-term policy response to growing Palestinian unemployment
caused by Israel's border closure and restrictions on Palestinian workers by Israel
in response to Palestinian violence. Toward the end of the Oslo period, it became
more apparent that public sector hiring to ease unemployment temporarily among
12. William A. Orme Jr., PalestinianEconomy in Ruins, UN. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A12.
13. Id.
14. See
WORLD
BANK,
POVERTY
IN
THE
WEST
BANK
AND
GAZA
(2001),
http://lnweb 18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Poverty+Report+WBG/$File/Poverty+report.pdf. This
report complements the study by the National Commission for Poverty Alleviation, PalestinianPoverty Report
1998, and is intended to increase the understanding of the causes of poverty in order to find ways to reduce poverty
among the Palestinians.
15. WORLD
BANK
GROUP,
WEST
BANK
AND
GAZA
IN
BRIEF
1
(2000),
http://lnwebl 8.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/All/F 192A5DA7D266F048525694700278825.
16. MAS, supra note 6, at 7.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Palestinians was simply unsustainable as a strategy to deal with Palestinian
20
poverty.
Policy experts and scholars recognized from the beginning of the Oslo
process that the key to successful Palestinian economic development would have
to be the private sector. 2 1 However, in the Oslo period, both domestic and
foreign private investment failed to materialize on the scale and in the amounts
needed for successful economic development. Border closures, increasing
violence, mounting unemployment, and a bloated public sector made for an
unattractive environment for private investors during the Oslo period. The lack of
significant private investment simply magnified the growing crisis in the
Palestinian economy.
The steadily declining condition of the Palestinian economy in the Oslo period
was connected to 6ther powerful forces pushing many Palestinians toward
poverty. One such force has been the incredible population growth in the
Palestinian Territories. The World Bank noted that the demographic growth rate
in the Palestinian Territories "is among the highest in the world."22 Thus, the
Palestinian population was dramatically increasing at the same time economic
prospects for Palestinians were worsening. The demographic problem has
already caused serious crowding problems in housing for low-income
Palestinians, who make up the majority of the Palestinian population.23 The poor
housing situation in the Palestinian Territories also brings to light the economic
nightmare that would occur when a final settlement between Palestinian and
Israelis allows Palestinian refugees living in other countries to return to the
Palestinian Territories. The return of Palestinian refugees to the Palestinian state
would simply aggravate a terrible economic situation.
C. The New Intifada: September 2000 to Present
The final phase in this overview of the devastated Palestinian economy is the
dark period after the new Palestinian intifada began in late September 2000. The
new intifada, and the Israeli reaction to it, essentially meant the Oslo peace
process was over. This new wave of violence occurred when the Palestinian
20. Id.
21. See generally David Fidler, Peace Through Trade? Developments in Palestinian Trade Law During the
Peace Process, 38 VA. J.INT'L L. 155 (1998); see also Mel Levine, PalestinianEconomic Progress Under the
Oslo Agreements, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1393 (1996).
22. WORLD BANK, supra note 14, at 1.
23. MAS,supra note 6, at 24.
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economy was on the edge of the abyss, and the new intifada and Israeli
responses have pushed the Palestinian economy over the edge. The United
Nations estimated that Palestinian poverty increased fifty percent in the first three
months of the new intifada, placing the overall Palestinian poverty rate at thirty
percent. 4 The World Bank echoed such pessimistic observations by predicting
that the Palestinian poverty rate would soon reach fifty percent of the overall
Palestinian population living in the Palestinian Territories.25 These staggering
poverty statistics illustrate the current scope of the Palestinian poverty problem.
II. ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY ALLEVIATION, AND GLOBALIZATION

As Part I indicated, the Palestinian poverty problem arises from a myriad of
causes that relate to the unique political, geographical, and cultural context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Addressing this problem will involve overcoming
region-and dispute-specific issues. At the same time, focusing on the
importance of globalization in connection to alleviating Palestinian poverty is
crucial. While some blame globalization for many of the world's current
problems, rarely is the discourse about the process of globalization connected to
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because the conflict is decades old and has unique
characteristics not seen in other parts of the world. However, Palestinian
economic development must occur in the context of globalization that now
confronts every country and region. The Palestinian poverty problem and its
resolution are, thus, linked to globalization.
"Globalization" is not easily defined and tends to mean different things
depending on the context in which it is used.2 6 I do not intend to try to provide a
definitive definition for globalization in this note. Rather, I want to focus on the
more general connection between the processes of globalization and economic
development and poverty alleviation. Globalization literature is full of arguments
that globalization both alleviates and causes poverty, and I do not intend to resolve

24. OFFICE OF THE
CONFRONTATIONS

U.N. SPECIAL CO-ORDINATOR, THE IMPACT ON THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY OF
MOBILITY

RESTRICTIONS

AND

BORDER

CLOSURES

(2000),

http://domino.un.org/JUNISPAL.NSF/22f43ledb91c6f548525678a005l beld/a2a4763bcfa5fel3852569ac00638c4c.
25. WORLD

BANK,

THE

IMPACT

OF

PROLONGED

CLOSURE ON

PALESTINIAN

POVERTY

(2000),

http://lnweb 18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/closure/$File/Closure+Article-H.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction, I IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. I (1993).
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that dispute either.27 My focus is on a basic observation: economic development
and poverty alleviation today require a global strategy that connects an economy
with other markets, technologies, capital, and resources.
During the Cold War, communist and capitalist states waged an ideological
battle about the proper approach to economic development. Developing countries
added to the diversity of approaches to economic development by adopting
various forms of autarkic growth or hybrids of socialist/capitalist models. For
socialist and many developing countries, interconnectedness with capitalist
economies was anathema, and thus, a theme of economic planning was to
disconnect national economies from international markets and market forces.
These different attitudes toward economic development involved, of course,
different perspectives on how to deal with poverty. The Cold War period did not
exhibit any consensus or unity on how states should approach poverty alleviation
and economic development.
In the post-Cold War period, the ideological and political differences on
economic development strategy that characterized the Cold War have largely
disappeared. One does not see today policy-makers or academics arguing for
poor countries to disengage from international markets as the best method to deal
with poverty. Many factors contribute to this dramatic change in world politics,
but key among them are: (1) advances in new forms of technologies, especially
information technologies; and (2) the dominance of liberal or neo-liberal economic
thinking in international economic policy-making.
New advances in information technology, international communications, and
global transportation have made the world a much smaller place.2 8 The flow of
goods, services, and knowledge now traverse the globe much more rapidly,
especially because of innovations such as the Internet. 29 Advances in technology
have forced governments and companies to become more aware of technology
being used elsewhere in the world in order to remain internationally competitive.30
This dynamic further advances globalization because states must reduce their
control of new technologies in order to allow domestic companies to compete
abroad. 31 The technological advances create an environment in which economic
27. WORLD
BANK,
POVERTY
IN
AN
AGE
OF
GLOBALIZATION
(2000),
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/globalization/povertyglobalization.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. DAVID P. FIDLER & FADI G. HARB, IN PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON POLIrnCSAND
ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2002).
31. Id.
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enterprises need to be connected electronically and commercially with other
companies and markets.
Liberal or neo-liberal economic thinking reinforces this need for global
connectivity. Neo-liberalism as a strategy for economic development stresses
four basic things: (1) the flow of capital, goods, and services free from state or
government interference; (2) deregulation, allowing the market forces to
self-regulate; (3) privatization of public enterprise and state owned economic
32
assets; and (4) a greater move to individualism and individual responsibility.
The removal of trade barriers such as tariffs, regulations, certain standards,
legislation and regulatory measures, as well as removal of restrictions on capital
flows and investments play a crucial role in accomplishing the economic and
political goals of neo-liberalism. The objective of the neo-liberal approach is
essentially to make trade and commercial activity among nations easier.33 The
thrust of neo-liberalism is to connect companies and national economies in global
markets. The technological advances mentioned earlier fit powerfully into the
neo-liberal conception of economic development.
For purposes of Palestinian economic development and poverty alleviation,
the main message of the above analysis is not that neo-liberalism and technology
are panaceas but that any strategy for Palestinian economic development has to
factor in the need for global connectivity created by the processes of
globalization. Although the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has its own unique
circumstances, the protagonists of this conflict cannot ignore that globalization
affects how Palestinians, Israelis, international organizations, and other countries
approach the alleviation of Palestinian poverty.
The crafters of the Oslo peace process understood the demands globalization
placed on strategies for Palestinian economic development by trying to develop a
framework in which the Palestinian economy could be connected with the global
marketplace. Part III describes Oslo's globalization approach to Palestinian
economic development and the reasons why this approach ultimately failed. The
collapse of the peace process has brought forth new strategies from the Israeli
government that would take the Palestinian economy in a direction contrary to the
global connectivity required by globalization. Part IV then explores these

32. Elizabeth Martinez & Arnoldo Garcia, What is "Neoliberalism"? A Brief Definitionfor Activists, at

http://www.corpwatch.org/issues/PID.jsp?articleid=376 (last visited Dec. 16, 2001).
33. Global

Issues,

A

Primer

http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Neoliberalism.asp.

on

Neoliberalism,

at
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disturbing developments and their implications for the Palestinian poverty
problem.
III.

THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN THE

OSLO ACCORDS AND ITS FAILURE

A. Introduction to the Peace Process
The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians formally began on
September 13, 1993 when Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles
34
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I).
As stated in the preamble
of Oslo I, the goals of the peace process were to "put an end to decades of
confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights,
strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation
through the agreed political process. 3 5 Israel and the PLO were to achieve these
goals in phases; and follow-up agreements, commonly known as Oslo II and Oslo
III, focused on the concrete implementation of the Oslo I goals. 36 The
Palestinians were to govern themselves in the Palestinian Territories and directly
elect their government; public order and security was to be turned over to the
Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories; Israel was to withdraw its forces from
the Palestinian Territories; and the framework was to be laid for Palestinian
economic development.37

During the peace process, economic development in the Palestinian
Territories was seen as crucial to securing a lasting peace in the region. On that
premise, the negotiators of the Oslo Accords attempted to craft a framework to
stimulate Palestinian economic development and contribute to a sustainable peace.
The Oslo economic development strategy contained four elements that were
central to encouraging growth in the Palestinian economy: (1) the flow of
international aid; (2) continued close Israeli-Palestinian economic relations; (3) the
34. Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, lsr. -P.L.O, 32 LL.M.
1525 [hereinafter Oslo I]; available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2001).
35. Id.
36. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 551 [herinafter Oslo II], available at http://www.soas.ac.uk/Centres/IslamicLaw/AIIA.html;
Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Jan. 17, 1997, lsr.P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 650 [hereinafter Oslo II!].
37. Oslo I, supra note 34.
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influx of foreign investment; and (4) Palestinian access to foreign markets. 38 Each
element of the Oslo economic development strategy attempted to connect
Palestinian economic development to regional and international economic forces.
International aid from donor countries was to play a key role in the
development of a modem economic infrastructure for the Palestinian Territories.
The building of such an infrastructure would attract foreign investment, which
would stimulate private sector growth. 9 Utilization of international aid was
critical in the Oslo strategy for Palestinian economic development because it was
apparent to all involved with the peace process that aid would be needed to lay the
groundwork for the Palestinian economy to attract foreign investment and access
regional and global markets. International aid would thus facilitate the Palestinian
economy's connectivity to the rest of the world.
Continued close economic relations between the two parties would provide
Palestinian goods access to Israeli markets, which would facilitate Palestinian
economic integration into the larger regional economy. 40 The Israeli economy is
the biggest and most technologically advanced economy in the region. It is also
very connected to both European and North American markets. 4 1 With access to
the Israeli market, the Palestinian economy would connect not only to the
opportunities in Israel but also to the trade and commercial paths forged by Israeli
economic development beyond the Middle East. Thus, the Palestinian economy
could create synergies with Israel's responses to the processes of globalization.
The Oslo agreements attempted to achieve connectivity between the Israeli and
Palestinian economies through the establishment of a modified customs union
between Israel and the Palestinian Territories.4 2 The modified customs union
gave Palestinian products access to Israel's market and provided generally that
imports into Palestinian areas be subject to Israel's customs laws.4 3
The next strategic effort to connect the Palestinian economy with the rest of
the world was the Oslo emphasis on the importance of attracting foreign
38. Fidler, supra note 1, at 297.
39. David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on the Encouragement
ofInvestment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529, 533 (1995).
40. Id.
41. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the
America,
of
the
United
States
of
of
Israel
and
the
Government
Government
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOubO (Apr. 22, 1985); see also Jewish Virtual Library, L/d.&.tps
Union Trade Agreement, http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Economy/eutrade.html (Nov. 20, 1995).

42. Fidler, supra note 21, at 163; see also Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the
State of Israel and the P.L.O., Apr. 29, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 696 (1994).
43. Fidler, supranote 2 1, at 163
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investment into the Palestinian Territories. The crafters of the Oslo Accords
believed that the private sector should be the engine of Palestinian economic
development and thus made foreign investment a priority issue for the Palestinian
Authority." Foreign investors would bring capital, technology, and experience
that would connect the Palestinian economy to the processes of globalization at
many different levels.
The fourth strategic element was creating access for Palestinian enterprises
to trade with countries other than Israel. The Oslo agreement granted the
Palestinian Authority the power to negotiate trade agreements to create foreign
market opportunities for Palestinian products.4 5 Such trade agreements and the
commerce conducted under them would further stimulate interdependence
between the Palestinian economy and other countries. Connectivity to the global
economy would thus be achieved.
The Oslo strategy for Palestinian economic development is more complex
than what I present above. 46 However, the four strategic elements discussed
above demonstrate that the Oslo strategy conceived of Palestinian economic
development with the processes of globalization in mind. The strategy envisioned
a connected, outward-looking Palestinian economy able to take full advantage of
technological advances and the opportunities of neo-liberal economic
interdependence. The Oslo strategy aimed to globalize Palestinian economic
development and poverty alleviation efforts.
B. The Failureof the Oslo Economic Development Strategy
As Part I indicated, the Oslo peace process unraveled completely after the
new intifada began in September 2000. The violence committed by both sides
after September 2000 has adversely affected the Palestinian economy; but, as this
section explores, the Oslo strategy for Palestinian economic development broke
down long before the new intifada. None of the objectives targeted by the Oslo
strategy were achieved, leaving the Palestinians in very bad economic straits that
only continued to worsen after the new intifada began. The Oslo vision of
assisting the Palestinian Territories onto the path of globalization shattered under
the combined weight of violence, security measures, and continuing distrust and

44. Fidler, supra note 1, at 299
45. Id.
46. See FIDLER&

HARB, supra note 30.
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hatred between the two sides. Oslo's seeds of global economic connectivity for
the Palestinians were planted in barren soil.
1. The Breakdown of the FourPillars of the Oslo Strategyfor
PalestinianEconomic Development
a. InternationalAid
The international aid distributed by donor countries and international
organizations, such as the World Bank, never provided the economic stimulus for
private-sector investment anticipated at the beginning of the Oslo process. The
Palestinian Authority utilized most of the international aid for emergency funding
of various programs designed to maintain the economic status quo, rather than to
make significant infrastructure improvements.47 The amount of donor aid
declined 48 because of various factors, including donor uncertainty about the peace
process, differences between the Palestinian Authority and donors regarding
priorities for use of the aid, and the failure of the Palestinian Authority to commit
its own funds to public investment.
b. Close Israeli-PalestinianEconomic Ties
Israeli border closures in response to acts of Palestinian violence against
Israel wrecked the Oslo objective of creating close economic relations between
Israel and the Palestinian Territories through the modified customs union. The
lack of secure and continuous access to the Israeli market crippled Palestinian
businesses that tried to take advantage of this large and affluent market.
c. Attracting ForeignInvestment
The transference of international aid into nonproductive expenditures and the
repeated border closures created an environment in the Palestinian Territories that
was not attractive to foreign investors. Inflows of foreign capital were deemed
vital in the period of the peace process to stimulate the growth of the Palestinian
private sector, which the policy makers expected to be the real engine of

47. World Bank, West Bank and Gaza Update, at http://www.palecon.org/update/mar98/contents.html (First
Quarter 1998).
48. UNSCO,
Report
on
the
Palestinian
Economy,
Autumn
1999,
at

http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/unsco/palecon99/000.htm.
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Palestinian economic development. These crucial inflows of foreign capital never
materialized.
Another reason why foreign investors were scared off involved the political
and economic mismanagement of the Palestinian Authority. Two tremendous
problems facing the Palestinian Authority have been corruption and
mismanagement.4 9 One internal audit revealed that the Palestinian Authority could
not account for approximately U.S. $326 million, which amounted to forty
percent of its annual budget. 50 The scale of mismanagement not only made
international donors weary of providing the Palestinian Authority with further aid,
but also undermined the confidence of many foreign investors looking at the
Palestinian Territories as a potential investment location. The Palestinian
Authority further damaged prospects for Palestinian economic development when
it attempted to monopolize sectors of the Palestinian economy. 5 1 The Palestinian
Authority tried to mitigate some of this damage by privatizing certain industries;
however, experts argue that more had to be done by the Palestinian Authority in
order to encourage private sector growth.52 Finally, foreign investors were
deterred by the lack of an adequate legal and regulatory framework in the
Palestinian Territories to support and protect commercial activity at international
standards.53
d Trade Relations with Other Countries
While the Palestinian Authority exercised its power to enter into trade
agreements and arrangements with other countries, these agreements did not
provide a basis on which Palestinian economic growth could occur.54 Because all
Palestinian trade remained dependent on the Israeli trade infrastructure, border
closures wreaked havoc on Palestinian exports to markets beyond Israel.
This brief overview of the breakdown of the Oslo strategy for Palestinian
economic development illustrates that the peace process failed to produce the
desired connectivity between the Palestinian Territories and the processes of
globalization.55 Far from being globalized, the Palestinian economy remained
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Fidler, supra note 21, at 184-85.
Fidler, supra note 1, at 304.
See id.
SAYIGH & SHIKAKI, supra note 5, at 101.
Id. at 94-95, 100.
FIDLER& HARB, supra note 30, at 28.

55. See Fidler, supra note 1, at 300-09.
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trapped and virtually isolated. The peace process was not delivering higher
standards cf living for Palestinians, a situation which helped fuel discontent
among Palestinians with the peace process itself
2. Insecurity andIdeology: FactorsBehind the Collapse of the Peace
Process
The biggest factors in the failure of the Oslo strategy for Palestinian
economic development were insecurity and ideology. A central bargain in the
peace process was to be Israel's withdrawal from occupied Palestinian land in
exchange for territorial security and security for Israel's citizenry. Repeated acts
of Palestinian violence against Israelis meant that the peace process did not deliver
security for Israel. In the eight years since the peace process began, Palestinians
have killed more Israelis than in the prior fifteen years.56 Under Oslo II, the
Palestinian Authority was given the responsibility of preventing the planning and
execution of Palestinian attacks against Israel from areas under its jurisdiction. 7
With the increase in Palestinian violence after September 1993, it is clear that the
Palestinian Authority failed in this responsibility. The government of Israel, which
is responsible for the protection and security of its citizens, took action in
response to the frequent terrorist attacks. Israel's response, from border
closures to military retaliation, set in motion a downward cycle of reprisals and
further violence. In this environment, the Palestinian economy suffered terribly,
leading to harsh living conditions for Palestinians. These conditions fueled more
Palestinian bitterness, which triggered more violence and of course more border
closures and reprisals from Israel.
The extent and scale of the violence during the peace process also suggested
that neither side was ideologically committed to the vision of the Oslo peace
process. The following passage summarizes the heart of the problem by
addressing how each of the parties viewed one another during the peace process:
The two "sides" have nurtured their belief-systems, self image,
and image of the other in total isolation, each in the conviction
that they are right, of course, and that all "decent people" believe

56. Israel Gov't Press Office, The Prime Minister's Report: In 5 Years Since Oslo, More Israelis Have been
Killed by Palestinian Terroriststhan in the 15 Years Priorto the Accord: Death Toll Since Oslo is 50% Greater
Than Duringthe Intifada, at http://www.freeman.org/monline/oct98/gpol.htm (Sept. 11, 1998).
57. See Oslo I, supra note 36.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 9:32 5

as they do. To a large extent, each side view themselves as
"innocent victims" and the other side as "perpetrators."
Palestinians see themselves as dispossessed and disenfranchised.
Israelis see Palestinians as terrorists and aggressors.
Palestinians see Israelis as all-powerful conquerors, and
themselves as helpless victims. Israelis look at Israeli soldiers
and see in them their precious little children. Palestinians look at
the same soldiers and see instruments of occupation and
oppression. An Israeli settler is convinced that "everybody" has
agreed that the settlements will never be returned to Palestinian
sovereignty. A Palestinian is convinced that "everybody" agrees
that Jerusalem belongs to the Palestinians alone, and that the
"everybody knows" that the war in 1948 was begun by the
Zionists.58
Palestinian children continue to be taught to hate the state of Israel as well as
all Jews and are prevented from leaming anything about Israel5 9 other than what
they learn battling with Israeli soldiers. The Palestinian Authority verbally attacks
both Israel and the Jews through state run media and state-backed preachers in
mosques.60 Similarly, during the peace process, Israeli settlers, supported by the
government, continue to build new settlements in disputed areas they knew would
incite anger among Palestinians. 6 1 Israeli discontent with the peace process also
registered in the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu, who came into office
hostile toward the peace process and the Palestinian Authority.
In short, the Oslo strategy for Palestinian economic development unfolded in
an environment that was perhaps never conducive to a globalization of Palestinian
economic horizons. Through the Oslo process, experts perceived that globalizing
the Palestinian economy would provide the path for Palestinians to reduce and
perhaps escape deeply entrenched and worsening poverty. In the case of the
peace process, a globalization strategy foundered on violence and hatred endemic
to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

58.
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IV. CURRENT ISRAELI PERSPECTIVES ON PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY

A- Double Rejection: The New Intifada and the Election of Ariel Sharon
The death knell of the Oslo peace process began to ring in late September
2000 when the Palestinians began violent protests and attacks in what is referred
to as the second or new intifada. For many, the moment of Israeli rejection of
the peace process came in February 2001 when the Israeli people elected Ariel
Sharon to be Prime Minister by the widest margin of victory in Israeli history. As
Part I indicated, the deteriorating situation since late September 2000 has left the
Palestinian economy in shambles and Palestinian poverty reaching astounding
levels. The Palestinian poverty problem is worse than it has ever been. These
developments raise, of course, questions about what may be on the horizon for
dealing with this serious and disturbing increase in poverty and its attendant
suffering in the Palestinian Territories. In this part, I examine the Sharon
government's strategy to separate the Israeli and Palestinian people as a solution
to the current crisis. I describe the nature of this "separation strategy" and
critically analyze its implications for the Palestinian poverty problem.
B. The Sharon Government's SeparationStrategy
Ariel Sharon has consistently argued that the Oslo peace process is dead:
The Oslo accords are dead. Period. . . . The basis of those
accords was that all disputes must be settled at the negotiating
table, not by violence. As long as there is violence, it means
very clearly that the Oslo accords can no longer exist ....
I
6
2
am saying it very clearly, they no longer exist. Period.
Sharon's alternative vision for a settlement with the Palestinians represents a
radical departure from the assumptions and strategies seen in the Oslo process.
In July 2000, before elected Prime Minister, Sharon outlined his broad vision
for peace in what he called the "Six Red Lines for Peace. 6 3 His vision called for
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the following six principles: (1) An undivided Jerusalem under full Israeli control;
(2) Israel will retain under its full control sufficiently wide security zones in both
the east and west; (3) Jewish towns, villages, and communities in Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza, as well as access roads leading to them with sufficient security
margins will remain under full Israeli control; (4) Israel does not recognize any
right of return for Palestinian refugees; (5) Israel will control the fresh-water
aquifers in western Samaria; and (6) Areas under control of the Palestinian
Authority will be demilitarized, the Palestinians will have no army and only a
police force, and Israel will control the air space above the Palestinian
Territories. 64
Sharon's "Six Red Lines for Peace" contains nothing that deals with the
Palestinian poverty problem. The exclusive focus is on Israeli security. The
assumption in the Oslo peace process that continued Palestinian poverty would be
a threat to sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinians finds no
expression in the "Six Red Lines for Peace." Although not explicit, many of
Sharon's "red lines" would, if implemented, cause enormous problems for
Palestinian economic development, especially the demands for security zones
between Israel and Palestinian areas, no Palestinian right of return, and Israeli
control over fresh water. The tone of "Six Red Lines for Peace" also suggests
that Sharon has no intention of creating and nurturing close economic ties
between Israel and the Palestinians.
The objective of "Six Red Lines for Peace" appears to be isolating the
Palestinian Territories on terms conducive to Israeli security. How the Palestinian
people are supposed to deal with poverty simply is not a concern. As the violence
between Israel and the Palestinians has intensified and spread in 2001, Sharon's
ideas for a "settlement" between the warring sides have become more extreme
and point to a full, physical separation of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. This
"separation strategy" appears to contemplate sealing off the Palestinian Territories
with concrete barricades and waterless moats.65 In the past, Sharon proposed
building tunnels between the West Bank and Gaza Strip for Palestinian traffic to
allow Israelis and Palestinians to avoid each other, which is another example of
the mentality of a separation strategy.66
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In some cases, the Sharon government has already taken steps to move
toward a unilateral separation. In Ramallah, Israeli troops dug a moat around Bir
Zeit University, which is a center for activism.6 7 A similar moat was dug around
Jericho to prevent anyone from leaving the desert town.6 8 Israelis have also
accelerated measures to seal off a forty mile section of the West Bank behind
watchtowers and electronic fences in order to protect the Israeli coastal town of
Netanya. 69 Security officials estimate that in order to lay down concrete and
metal barriers across link roads between the West Bank and Israel will cost an
initial seventeen million pounds.70 On the few roads left open, security forces will
establish checkpoints and monitor traffic with motion-sensitive cameras and
watchtowers. 7 1 Currently, a majority of Israelis support a unilateral separation
72
from the Palestinians.
The development, however sketchy and haphazard, of a "separation strategy"
illustrates the extent of the fear, frustration, and despair at the collapse of the
peace process in Israel. If implemented, the separation strategy would result in
economic genocide for the Palestinians. Physical separation would prevent
Palestinian goods from flowing to Israel and to countries beyond the region.
Sealing off the West Bank would throw two million Palestinians out of work.73
In Ramallah, the moat the Israelis dug around Bir Zeit University caused 65,000
villagers to lose water and power because utility lines were cut, 7 4 which provides
some indication of the economic hardship more widespread implementation of the
separation strategy would cause Palestinians. The separation strategy, simply put,
is a recipe for a catastrophic increase in the Palestinian poverty problem.
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CONCLUSION

The Palestinian poverty problem has reached tragic proportions and is still
worsening. The prevailing approach to economic development and poverty
alleviation in the era of globalization involves technological and economic
openness and connectivity between countries and companies. The Oslo strategy
for Palestinian economic development incorporated this approach; and, despite the
collapse of the peace process, it is difficult to see how the Palestinian poverty
problem can be adequately addressed today without giving the Palestinian
economy and people the connectivity that characterizes and drives global
commerce. Palestinian poverty will not be reduced without Palestinian
participation in the processes of globalization.

Yet, relations between Israel and the Palestinians have deteriorated to the
point where nearly three-quarters of the Israeli population favors a "solution" to
the crisis that is, economically speaking, medieval in its techniques-walls and
moats-and disparity vis-a-vis the Palestinian people. At the same time, given the

nature of the violence and distrust on both sides, a return to the Oslo vision of a
globalized Palestinian economy looks equally unrealistic. The existing state of
affairs is enough to make even the staunchest opponent of human poverty despair
for those in the Palestinian Territories living in utter poverty and with no hope of

relief from their misery on the horizon.

